Seminarios del curso 2008-2009

September 2008

  • Monday 22 Dov Samet (Tel Aviv) :The sure-thing principle

October 2008

  • Friday 3 Ascensión Andina Díaz (U Malaga): «Strategic communication: a freelance journalist – editor game»
  • Friday 10 Arnold Polanski (Queens University Belfast): «Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions»
  • Friday 17Javier Rodero (Universidad de Málaga): «Coordination failure? Individual decision making under different guessing games»
  • Thursday and Friday 23/24 Macro Workshop
  • Friday 31 Annick Laruelle (U Pais Vasco): «Voting and collective decision making»

November 2008

  • Monday 3 Oliver Armentier (New York Fed): «Can Corruption be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment»
  • Friday 21 Peter Bossaerts (Swiss Finance Institute and EPFL): «Mentalizing in games and markets: a neuroeconomic perspective (paper 1, paper 2)»
  • Monday 24 Wouter Den Haan (U Amsterdam): «Anticipated growth and business cycles in matching models»
  • Friday and Saturday 28/29-11 IV Workshop on Social Decisions

December 2008

  • Friday 5 Antoine Martin (New York Fed): «The Welfare Effects of a Liquidity-Saving Mechanism – Postponed»
  • Friday 19 Jon Eguia (New York University): «Foundations of Spatial Preferences»

January 2009

  • Friday 9 (UMA-UPO Economics Seminar) Francis Bloch (E Polytechnique): «Cores of Combined Games»
  • Friday 16 Jose A García (C.La Mancha): «The Perverse Incentive of Knowing the Truth: Wrong Transparency»
  • Friday 23 Angel Hernando (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid): «When are Signals Complement or Substitutes?»
  • Friday 30 Sara Godoy (Universidad de Valencia):»People with (out) history: traceability and exemplar behavior in public good games»

February 2009

  • Friday 6 José Ramón Uriarte (U Pais Vasco): «Doubts and Equilibria»
  • Friday 13 (UMA-UPO Economics Seminar) Ted Bergstrom (UC Santa Barbara): «One chance in a million: Altruism and the bone marrow registry»
  • Friday 20 Francesco Feri (Innsbruck): «Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-scale experimental evidence»
  • Tuesday 24 (UMA-UPO Economics Seminar) Alain Trannoy (GREQAM): «Equality of Opportunity: Definitions and testable conditions, with an application to income in France»

March 2009

  • Friday 6 Ana Montes (U Murcia): «Modeling the immigration shock»
  • Friday 13 Doubleheader Aleks Berentsen (U Basel): «Liquidity and Growth»  and Christopher Waller (U Notre Dame): «Optimal Stabilization with Endogenous Firm Entry»
  • Friday 20 Antoine Martin (New York Fed): «Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets and Monetary Policy»
  • Thursday and Friday 26/27 Advances in the Analysis of Labor Markets with Frictions II
  • Monday 30 María Montero (Nottingham): «Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in legislatures»

April 2009

  • Wednesday 15 Ismael Rodríguez-Lara (Universidad de Alicante): «Self-Interested Justice Principles in the Dictator Game»
  • Friday 17 Pascal Mossay (Reading): «On Spatial Equilibria in a Social Interaction Model»
  • Friday 24 Fabrizio Germano (Universidad Pompeu Fabra): «On commercial media bias»
  • Thursday 30 Marco Van der Leij (Alicante): «Risk aversion and networks: Microfoundations for network formation

May 2009

  • Friday 8 Francisco Alcalá (Murcia):» Time, quality, and growth»
  • Friday 15 Julio Robledo (Nottingham): «Specialization in the bargaining family»
  • Monday 25 (UMA-UPO Economics Seminar) Gilat Levy (LSE): «A dynamic model of agenda formation»
  • Friday 29 Andrés Perea (U Maastricht): «Belief in the opponents’ future rationality»

June 2009

  • Friday 5 Samuel Danthine (UQ Montréal and U Málaga): «A siesta a day may actually pay»
  • Tuesday 9 (UMA-UPO Economics Seminar) Shlomo Weber (Southern Methodist U and CORE): «Existence of Pure Strategies Nash Equilibria Social Interaction Games: Interaction Games with Dyadic Externalities»
  • Friday 12 (UMA-UPO Economics Seminar) Fernando Vega Redondo (European University Institute): «Networks Emerging in a Volatile World
  • Friday 19 Angel Gavilán (Banco de España): «Asymetric Collateral Requirements and Output Composition»

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